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Abstract 
Combining two unique data sets, this paper explores the relationship between financial structure 
and firms’ access to financial services. Specifically, it considers the importance of three different 
types of financial institutions: low-end financial institutions, specialized lenders, and banks. Two 
findings stand out. First, dominance of the financial system by banks is associated with lower use 
of financial services by firms of all sizes, while low-end financial institutions and specialized 
lenders seem particularly suited to ease access to finance in low-income countries. Second, there 
is no evidence that smaller institutions are better in providing access to finance.  
 
JEL classification: G10, G30, O16  
Keywords: Financial Development, Structure of Financial Sector, Size of Financial Sector, 
Access to Finance, Small and Medium Enterprises  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The structure of the financial system is again in the headlines. Moving beyond the questions of 
banks vs. markets, policy makers are looking for advice on which kind of financial institutions 
and which market structures serve best in pushing out the access frontier. First, which institutions 
are best suited to expand financial services to low-end customers, including small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs)? Are these banks, which can exploit scale and technological capacity, 
or specialized lenders, such as leasing or factoring companies, which can offer expertise in 
tailored lending products, or low-end financial institutions, which are closest to customers? 
Second, are small or large financial institutions better in serving low-end customers? On the one 
hand, large institutions can exploit scale economies and better diversify risks; on the other hand, 
small institutions might have better local market knowledge and flatter hierarchies, both of which 
facilitate serving low-end customers. 
 
Combining two unique data sets, this paper explores the relationship between financial structure 
and access to finance. We capture financial structure in two ways. Specifically, we consider the 
importance of different financial institutions – including low-end financial institutions, 
specialized lenders and banks – by calculating (i) their asset share relative to total assets and (ii) 
the average size of those institutions. Firms’ access to financial services is measured by account 
and lending services.  We thus relate the probability that a firm uses specific financial services to 
(i) the relative importance and (ii) the average size of low-end financial institutions, specialized 
lenders and banks.  In addition, we explore the potential heterogeneity of these relationships both 
across countries at different levels of economic development, across industries with different 
needs for external finance and asset tangibility, and across firms of different sizes, thus taking 
into account the different needs and capacities of countries in supporting different financial 
structure, different constraints of firms of different sizes and different needs for external finance 
and availability of tangible assets as collateral across different industries. 
 
The relationship between financial structure, the average size of different financial institutions 
and access to finance is a critical question for policy makers. Access to financial services, 
especially by SMEs, has become critical in many developing countries. SMEs make up a large 
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part of the emerging private sector in most countries, but are also more constrained in their 
access to financial services than large firms (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2007; Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005). While micro-finance has helped alleviate access to 
finance by the poor by adopting specific lending techniques such as group lending, it seems less 
conducive to easing financing constraints of more formal and larger enterprises. More recently, 
specific financing forms such as leasing or factoring have been promoted as conducive to easing 
financing constraints of SMEs, as they are based on the underlying assets and cash flows rather 
than borrowers’ financial history (Berger and Udell, 2006). On the other hand, banks, 
particularly large banks, have also shown increased interest in SME financing, exploiting scale 
economies and technology (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2011a). The question on 
the size of financial institutions – often intertwined with the ownership question – is directly 
related to entry barriers and minimum capital requirements imposed by policy makers in 
developing countries to foster a specific market structure (Beck et al., 2011b; Beck et al., 2011c 
and World Bank, 2011).  
 
While specialized lenders and low-end financial institutions make up only a small part of the 
financial system in most countries in terms of volume, their importance for SMEs’ access to 
finance can be considerable.  For example, in Bolivia, lending by microfinance institutions and 
cooperative made up only 8.8 percent of GDP in 2009 compared to 24.8 percent by banks.  But 
the number of loan accounts per 1000 adults was 72 for these low-end financial institutions, as 
opposed to 76 for banks (CGAP, 2010).1  As another example, according to Kraemer-Eis and 
Lang (2012) SMEs in the Eurozone finance 17 percent of their fixed asset investment with 
leasing contracts, compared to 31 percent with bank loans.  While referring to developed 
countries, this example gives insight into the potential importance of non-bank lending and the 
institutions providing it. 
 
This paper uses a unique dataset to shed light on the relationship between the structure of the 
financial system and the size of its institutions, on the one hand, and access to financial services 
by enterprises, on the other hand. Specifically, using data from the World Bank and IMF’s 
                                               
1 Unfortunately, this data collection exercise on loan account penetration across different segments of the financial 
system is cross-sectional and we can therefore not use these data for the exercise in our paper.  
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Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), we are able to compute both the relative 
importance of different segments of the financial system that cater to low-end customers, such as 
SMEs, as well as the average size of institutions within this segment. We then match these 
country-level indicators to firm-level indicators from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys on 
actual use of deposit and loan services by enterprises in developing and emerging countries. In 
addition, we examine the relationship between financial structure and firms’ access to finance 
across countries at different levels of GDP per capita, across firms of different sizes, across 
industries with different needs of external finance, and across industries with different levels of 
tangible assets to thus take explicitly into account the potential cross-county, cross-firm and 
cross-industry heterogeneity in the effect of financial structure on firms’ access to finance.  
 
Our research speaks to several literatures. First, the financial structure literature has discussed the 
implications of bank- vs. market-based financial systems for firm, industry and GDP per capita 
growth2, but has not considered the importance of other segments of the financial system, 
including specialized lenders such as leasing, finance or factoring companies or low-end 
financial institutions such as cooperatives, credit unions and microfinance institutions. This 
paper is the first, to our knowledge, that explores the relationship between the importance of 
these two segments focused on SME lending for access to finance by enterprises. Theory and 
literature offer different predictions on the effect of importance of these segments on firms’ 
access to finance. On the one hand, specialized lenders can exploit their expertise in specific 
lending products such as leasing and factoring to improve firms’ access to external finance. 
Similarly, low-end financial institutions might have an advantage in working with smaller and 
less formal enterprises than banks, as they are closer to the client and might have more adequate 
organizational structures, such as flat hierarchies, and lending techniques, such as group 
lending.3 On the other hand, banks have a larger scale and technical capacity to cater to a large 
number of low-end clients (De la Torre, Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2010). They might be 
therefore in a better position to invest in technology and risk management systems than other 
financial institutions.  
                                               
2 For the relationship between the degree to which a country is bank- or market-based and firm, industry and GDP 
per capita growth, see Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), Beck and Levine (2002) and Levine (2002),  
respectively.  
3 See Armendariz and Morduch (2005), Karlan and Morduch (2010) and Banerjee and Duflo (2010) for surveys and 
more in-depth discussions on microfinance. 
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Second, our research speaks to a large literature on the effects of the size of financial institutions 
on firms’ access to financial services (Berger, Hasan and Klapper, 2004). This literature has 
focused mostly on the size of banks, but has not come to an unambiguous result. On the one 
hand, smaller banks might be closer to the client and can use relationship lending to effectively 
serve small and medium-sized enterprises. On the other hand, larger banks might have an 
advantage in using transaction-based lending techniques such as leasing or factoring. While this 
literature has focused on banks, we expand it to consider the relationship between the average 
size of low-end financial institutions, specialized lenders and access to finance by enterprises. 
Similar arguments as for banks can be made for non-bank institutions. On the one hand, smaller 
institutions might be closer to the client; on the other hand, larger institutions might serve these 
clients more effectively by exploiting their scale.  
 
Third, our paper is part of a still growing literature on firms’ access to external finance. 
Systematic and consistent cross-country data collections of firm-level survey data since the late 
1990s have enabled a rigorous exploration of the finance-growth link on the micro-level.  
Financial development allows existing firms to exploit growth and investment opportunities 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005), and to achieve larger equilibrium size (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2006). Small firms do not only report higher financing 
obstacles, they are also more adversely affected by these obstacles in their operation and growth 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005; Beck et al., 2008). Our paper adds to this 
literature by exploring the importance of non-bank financial institutions catering to SMEs for 
their financing constraints.4  
 
Our results can be summarized as follows: First, dominance of the financial system by banks 
rather than other financial institutions is associated with lower use of financial services by firms 
of all sizes, while low-end financial institutions and specialized lenders seem particularly suited 
to ease access to finance in low-income countries. Second, there is no evidence that smaller 
institutions are better in providing access to finance. To the contrary, larger specialized lenders 
                                               
4 In a broader sense, our paper also adds to the finance and growth literature.  For a survey, see Levine (2005). 
Among more recent contributions, see Rousseau and D’Onofrio (2012) who show that banking sector development 
is indeed important for economic development in Africa.  
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and banks are more conducive to firms’ access to finance and larger low-end financial 
institutions are more conducive to firms’ access to finance in low-income countries.   These 
results hold controlling for a large number of firm characteristics, the level of economic 
development and a general indicator of financial development.  We also find that the economic 
effect of the estimated relationships is large, especially on the credit side.   
 
Before proceeding, an important caveat is due. Our results derive from cross-sectional variation 
across countries and although we control for an array of firm and country characteristics, we can 
therefore not completely exclude the possibility of omitted variable bias.5 We mitigate this 
concern, however, by testing for the differential relationship between financial structure and 
average size of financial institutions, on the one hand, and access to external finance by firms in 
countries at different levels of GDP per capita, firms of different sizes and firms in industries 
with different financing needs. It is important to stress, however, that we do not interpret our 
findings as causal relationships.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the data sources 
and variables we use. Section 3 presents methodology and section 4 our results. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
 
2. DATA 
 
We use data from two main sources to construct our sample. We use the Financial Sector  
Assessment Program (FSAP) reports, which are jointly prepared by the IMF and World Bank6, to 
construct our measures of the importance and average size of different segments of the financial 
system and firm-level data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys to measure firms’ access 
to and use of financial services. Since there is limited overlap between the two datasets, we end 
up with a total of 54 sample countries and up to 50 countries per regressions.  In most 
                                               
5 We are less concerned about reverse causation, as this would bias our findings downwards, as we expect low-end 
financial institutions and specialized lenders to be actively fostered in countries with limited access by firms to 
financial services.  
6 To be exact, FSAP is a joint undertaking of the World Bank and the IMF in developing and emerging market 
countries and of the IMF alone in advanced economies. 
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regressions, however, we have fewer than 50 countries limited given data availability. All our 
countries are developing or emerging countries, with 19 countries in Europe and Central Asia, 10 
countries in Latin America, 23 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 2 countries in East Asia and 
Pacific. The level of economic development, as measured by GDP per capita (in constant 2000 
USD), varies significantly across our sample countries, ranging from 134 USD in Malawi to 
7,229 USD in Uruguay.  
 
Established in 1999, the FSAP is a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of a country’s financial 
sector. Historically, full FSAP updates take place about every four to seven years in any given 
country. Among other things, the reports generally include a table that reports on the country’s 
financial structure broken down into institutional categories such as banks, insurance companies 
or pension funds. The aggregation level of institutional categories varies across reports. There is 
no standardized categorization of institutions; while one report may have “banks” as one 
institutional category, another report may have “private banks” and “state-owned banks” as 
institutional categories instead, which combined would be equivalent to the category “banks” in 
the former report. The table typically provides the following information for each institutional 
category: number of institutions, assets in (mostly) local currency units, assets as a percentage of 
total financial sector assets and assets as percentage of GDP. Note that not all reports report data 
in all four categories and while reports generally include a couple of years of historic data they 
may record data in one category for one year but not the next and often data just for one or two 
years are reported.7 Using this financial structure information, we build a database from all 
financial structure information reported in table form in FSAP reports from the beginning of the 
program until mid 2009.  
 
For some countries, more than one FSAP report is available. Unfortunately, the reporting 
structure is almost never the same as in the previous report(s) for the same country and cross-
checks of the data revealed that the reported information is not even necessarily consistent across 
reports for the same country. We therefore assume that the most recent report contains the most 
accurate information and only keep observations from the most recent report available. Our final 
                                               
7 See Appendix Table 1 below for data availability across countries and categories. 
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database consists of an unbalanced panel for 89 countries over the years 1995-2008. We convert 
any variables in local currency units into 2000 constant US dollars using exchange rates from the  
IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  
 
While we have data available for a broader array of institutions, we focus on three types. First, 
low-end financial institutions (low-end NBFIs) which include credit unions, building societies, 
community banks, cooperatives, microfinance institutions, cash lenders, mutual banks, postal 
banks, rural banks, savings and loans institutions, and thrift banks. This category is supposed to 
capture non-bank institutions that serve the low-end of the market, including SMEs. Second, 
specialized non-bank financial institutions (specialized NBFIs) which comprise – among others – 
finance companies, factoring companies, banks specialized in housing, merchant banks, and 
special credit institutions. This category is supposed to capture non-bank financial institutions 
that specialize in certain lending activities that might be more attractive for small and medium-
sized enterprises, such as leasing and factoring. The final category is deposit-taking or 
commercial banks (banks).8 
 
We use the FSAP data to construct two indicators. The asset share is calculated as each type’s 
assets relative to the sum of low-end financial institutions, specialized non-bank financial 
institutions and commercial bank financial assets and gauges the importance of each segment 
within the financial system. The three asset shares add up to 100.9 The average size is computed 
by dividing the total amount of assets per category by the number of institutions per category. 
We do not normalize this indicator as we are interested in capturing scale economies proxied by 
the size of the respective institution.10  
 
                                               
8 We carefully screen and group institutions into those three categories to arrive at comparable institutional 
categories across countries. We believe that by focusing on those three aggregate categories (as opposed to more 
detailed categories) we can best construct comparable categories across countries despite potential regulatory 
differences.  
9 There are other categories such as insurance companies or pension funds that we do not include in our analysis. It 
is important to note that the relative share of banks is only relative to other non-bank financial institutions catering to 
the low-end of the market, not to other segments of the financial system, such as capital markets.  It can therefore 
not be compared to the financial structure measures used in the previous literature, by e.g. Beck and Levine (2002) 
and Levine (2002).  
10 Note that we are controlling for GDP per capita, so we are conditioning on the level of economic development, 
which might cause a spurious correlation between the size of financial institutions and firms’ access to financial 
services.  
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Both indicators vary widely across our sample countries. The share of banks varies from almost 
99 percent in Ukraine to 61 percent in Colombia. The share of specialized lenders varies from 38 
percent in Colombia to less than one percent in Senegal, Ukraine, Bolivia, and Madagascar. The 
share of low-end financial institutions varies from 21 percent in Burkina Faso to less than one-
half percent in Chile and Latvia. The average size of banks in USD ranges from 3.5 billion in 
Turkey to 10 million in Guinea-Bissau. The average size of specialized lenders varies from 350 
million USD in Chile to less than one million in Mongolia. The average size of low-end financial 
institutions varies from 800 million in Turkey to less than one million in Mongolia.  
 
While the share of low-end and specialized lenders in total assets of financial intermediaries 
catering to low-end customers might seem low, it is important to remember that behind a small 
volume can be a large number of borrowers, as we already discussed in the Introduction.  
Unfortunately, data on the number of loan accounts or borrowers across these different segments 
of the financial system catering to SMEs are even scarcer than asset data.  
 
We combine the financial structure data with data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The 
Enterprise Surveys collect firm level-data from key manufacturing and service sectors in over 
120 countries since 2002.11 Countries are surveyed every three to four years but not 
simultaneously. To ensure data consistency and inter-country comparability we only use data in 
the standardized dataset 2006-2010, which contains data for enterprises across 100 countries.12 It 
is important to note that FSAP and Enterprise Survey do not necessarily take place in the same 
year, though we match the FSAP and Enterprise Survey that are closest in time. The number of 
firms surveyed in each country depends on the size of the economy with more firms being 
surveyed in larger economies and is chosen to make each country’s sample representative of the 
non-agricultural private economy.  
 
From the Enterprise Survey we construct the following three indicators to gauge the access to 
and use of financial services: (i) account is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an 
                                               
11 Only private sector firms are surveyed; fully state-owned firms are excluded. 
12 Due to changes in the questionnaire data from the earlier years cannot be easily compared to data collected in the 
more recent years. In the six instances where multiple years of data are available for a given country, we keep only 
the most recent year of data. 
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account at the time of the survey and zero otherwise; (ii) overdraft is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the firm has an overdraft facility at the time of the survey and zero otherwise; and (iii) 
loan is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a line of credit or loan from a financial 
institution at the time of survey and zero otherwise.  
 
We match the two samples by building a cross-sectional dataset that matches the firm 
characteristics with the average of the available data from the FSAP reports. Maximum country 
overlap between the two data sources is 54 countries with over 25,000 firm level observations. 
Appendix Table 1 lists the countries in our sample, a breakdown of the firm distribution by 
country, and by-country summary statistics of the FSAP variables we will use in the subsequent 
analysis. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and Table 2 correlations on the country-level.  
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that over 90 percent of firms in our sample have an 
account. This percentage, however, varies significantly across countries. While in the Slovak 
Republic 20.8 percent of firms have an account, 99.8 percent do so in Croatia. Almost 50 percent 
of firms have an overdraft facility and 45 percent have a loan. Behind this average, however, are 
again large cross-country variations. While only 1.3 percent of firms have an overdraft facility 
and 3.1 percent a loan in Guinea-Bissau, 87.5 percent and 74.5 percent, respectively, do so in 
Chile.  
 
We also use information from the Enterprise Surveys to control for firm-level characteristics that 
might affects a firm’s ease of access to financial products. In particular, we construct dummy 
variables for firm size (small, up to 19 employees; medium, 20-99 employees; large, 100 or more 
employees), being a subsidiary, and being publicly listed, and control for the percentage of the 
firm owned by private foreign owners and the percentage of a firm owned by the state, as well as 
the firm’s age. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that 47.4 percent of all firms are small, 
34.3 percent are medium-sized and 18.3 percent large. 13 percent are subsidiaries of other firms, 
and 5.8 percent are publicly listed. The foreign ownership share is, on average, 10.7 percent, 
while the average government ownership is 0.7 percent. On average, firms are 17.5 years old.  
13 
 
 
We control for the level of development and the depth of the financial sector using the log of 
GDP per capita and credit to the private sector as percentage of GDP, respectively. The data 
come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The rationale for including credit 
to the private sector as control is that, beyond the general level of development, financial 
structure might be a function of the depth of the financial sector. The average depth of the 
financial sector in our sample is 25.6 percent, ranging from just over 2 percent in Guinea-Bissau 
to 80.3 percent in Chile. 
 
We also control for industry-level variation in the need for external finance. Specifically, we use 
the Rajan and Zingales (1998) indicator on the fraction of investment that cannot be financed 
through internal cash flows, computed over the 1980s for listed firms in the U.S. The underlying 
assumption in Rajan and Zingales and our work is that for technological reasons some industries 
depend more heavily on external finance than others and that this industry variation does not 
differ across countries.13 We use the self-reported industry categorization by firms in the 
Enterprise Surveys to match with the Rajan and Zingales classification. Since this variable is 
only available for manufacturing industries, we lose about a half of our sample. The average 
fraction of external need for finance across our sample is 0.29, varying from -0.45 (tobacco) to 
1.14 (plastic products).  
 
Finally, we control for the industry-level variation in the tangibility of asset as computed by 
Braun (2003) for listed firms in the U.S. in the period 1986 to 1995. Tangibility is defined as net 
property, plant and equipment divided by the book value of assets. Since tangible assets are 
typically more easily collaterizeable, firms in countries with weak contractability are often 
reliant on them to secure external funding and we would expect firms with higher tangibility to 
be more likely to have access to external funding. Similarly to Rajan and Zingales (1998), the 
underlying assumption here is that due to technology, tangibility is industry specific and does not 
differ across countries. We use the self-reported industry categorizations by firms in the 
Enterprise Surveys to match our data. Again, we lose about a half our sample due to the fact that 
                                               
13 As noted by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2010), using data from one specific country as benchmark for other 
countries can introduce attenuation or amplification biases in the estimation.  Nevertheless, we follow a large 
literature using this difference-in-differences approach with industry characteristics based on U.S. data.  
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only manufacturing industries are covered by the variable. The average tangibility in our sample 
is 0.30, varying from 0.07 (pottery, china, earthenware) to 0.67 (petroleum refineries). 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
The correlations in Table 2 suggest that there is no systematic relationship between the country-
level metrics of financial segment size. Not surprisingly, however, the average asset size 
variables of some of the institutional categories are positively and significantly correlated. The 
depth of the financial system as measured by private credit as percentage of GDP is, as expected, 
positively and significantly correlated with the mean asset size of all institutional categories 
except low-end NBFIs. There are no significant correlations between the asset shares of the 
different segments of the financial system and our access to finance variables. There are, 
however, significant correlations between the average size of financial institutions and the access 
to finance variables. Countries with larger specialized lenders and larger banks have a higher 
share of firms with overdraft facilities and loans. There are also significant positive correlations 
between the depth of the financial system and all three measures of access to finance. Many of 
the firm characteristics are also correlated with each other. Countries with more small firms, for 
instance, have younger and fewer listed firms. Lastly, our access indicators are also significantly 
correlated with our industry indicators of external dependence and tangibility. In countries where 
firms are on average more reliant on external finance firms are more likely to have an account, a 
loan or an overdraft. A higher average tangibility of assets, however, is only significantly related 
to firms having loans.  
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
To estimate the effect of the mean asset size and assets as share of total assets of different types 
of financial institutions on the use of financial services we use the following empirical baseline 
specification:  
 
Financial Servicesij = a + b1 Medium Firmij + b2 Large Firmij + b3 Subsidiaryij  
15 
 
         + b4 Publicly Listedij + b5 Foreign-Ownedij + b6 State-Ownedij  
        + b7 Firm Ageij + b8 Firm Sectorij + b9 GDP per Capitaj  
         + b10 Private Creditj + b11 Financial Sector Indicatorj + eij 
 
where Financial Services indicates one of our three dependent variables measuring the use of 
financial services of firm i in country j. We use a probit model to estimate the specification. 
Financial Sector Indicator is our independent variable of interest that varies across regressions: 
average size or assets as share of financial sector assets per the institutional categories low-end 
financial institutions, specialized lenders, and banks. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level in all specifications so that we allow for correlation of error terms across firms within a 
country but not across countries. In order to gauge not only the statistical but also economic 
significance of our results, we report marginal effects rather than coefficient estimates.  
 
In a second step, we want to assess whether the relationship between financial structure and 
access to financial services varies across countries with different levels of economic 
development, across firms of different sizes, across industries with different needs for external 
finance and across industries with different proportions of tangible assets. We therefore interact, 
in separate regressions, the Financial Sector Indicator with GDP per capita, with dummy 
variables indicating that the firm is small, medium or large size, with the Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) indicator of external dependence or the Braun (2003) measure of tangibility.14 In the case 
of interactions with size dummies, we do not include the financial service indicator by itself, 
while in the case of interaction regressions with external dependence and tangibility we include 
both external dependence or tangibility and its interaction with the financial service indicator. 
Since Ai and Norton (2003) have shown that it might be difficult to interpret the marginal effects 
of interaction terms in non-linear models, we run these regressions with OLS.  
 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
                                               
14 To evaluate the regressions for certain values of the interaction variables we use the margins command in Stata. 
The standard errors are calculated using the linearization method to allow for heteroskedasticity or other violations 
of distributional assumptions and correlation among observations. 
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Tables 3 and 5 report our main results using asset share and average size as financial sector 
indicators, respectively, while Tables 4 and 6 report the regressions with interaction terms. In the 
case of Tables 4 and 6, Panel A reports the coefficient estimates, while Panel B reports the 
partial effects at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of GDP per capita and the external 
dependence ratio. In the interest of space and readability, we report marginal effects of all 
variables in Table 3, while in all subsequent tables we report just the coefficients of interest, 
namely the coefficients of the Financial Sector Indicator and interaction terms. Due to data 
limitations on the average size variables the country sample and the number of firms do not stay 
constant across specifications in Tables 5 and 6.15  
 
(a) Asset shares across different segments  
 
The results in Table 3 suggest that there is no significant relationship between the importance of 
low-end financial institutions and firms’ access to financial services. However, we find that firms 
in countries with a larger share of specialized lenders are more likely to have an overdraft and a 
loan, and these relationships are significant at the 5 percent level. We also find that a larger share 
of banks in total financial assets is associated with lower use of financial services by 
enterprises.16 The share of bank assets in total financial assets enters negatively and significantly 
at the 10 percent level in the regression of account and overdraft and negatively and significantly 
at the 1 percent level in the regression of loans. Overall, the results thus suggest that specialized 
lenders are an important segment in the financial system when it comes to providing access to 
credit for firms.  
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
The relationship between the relative importance of banks and specialized NBFIs and firms’ 
access to finance is not only statistically but also economically significant.  Specifically, a one 
standard deviation in the share of specialized NBFI (7.6 percent) results in 5.3 percent higher 
                                               
15 The dependent variables in tables 3 and 5 allow for a balanced panel across countries by construction. 
16 As this result might be driven by the inclusion of an overall indicator of financial intermediary development 
(Private Credit to GDP), we also ran the regressions without this variable.  While excluding Private Credit to GDP 
confirms our findings on the share of bank assets and the share of specialized NBFI, we now also find some 
evidence for a positive association of the share of low-end NBFI and access to finance by enterprises.  
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probability that a firm has an overdraft and a 3.0 percent higher likelihood of a loan. A one 
standard deviation in the share of banks (8.6 percent), on the other hand, results in 1.7 percent 
lower likelihood that firms have a bank account, a 3.4 percent lower likelihood of a loan and a 
5.1 percent lower likelihood of an overdraft. This compares to 90 percent of firms in our sample 
having an account, 49 percent having an overdraft and 45 percent having a loan. The 
economically larger effects are thus clearly in access to credit rather than access to deposit 
accounts.  
 
The coefficient estimates on our control variables are largely as expected and hold across the 
three categories of financial institutions. Firms in countries with higher GDP per capita as well as 
medium and large firms are more likely to have an account, overdraft facility, and loan. In more 
financially developed countries firms are more likely to have an account and loan, however this 
holds only for the regressions controlling for the share of specialized lenders and banks. Firms 
that are subsidiaries are more likely to have an account and an overdraft facility, while there 
appears to be no significant relationship between a firm being publicly listed and its use of 
financial services. As the percentage of foreign ownership in a firm increases firms are more 
likely to have an account. However, they are also less likely to have to have a loan. Firms are 
also less likely to have a loan as the percentage of state ownership in a firm increases suggesting 
that in both cases alternative financing options might be available to such firms. Finally, the 
older firms are the more likely they are to have an account and overdraft facility.  
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
The results of Table 4 show that our results from above largely hold once we interact the asset 
shares with level of economic development, level of external dependence, tangibility, and firm 
size even though there is some variation in significance across countries with different levels of 
GDP per capita and firms of different size. The interactions with GDP per capita show that the  
relationship between the importance of low-end financial institutions, specialized lenders and 
access to finance varies significantly across countries with different levels of economic 
development. While the asset share of low-end financial institutions enters positively and 
significantly in the regressions of account and overdraft, its interaction with GDP per capita 
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enters negatively and significantly. When we calculate the partial effects (Panel B) for the share 
of low-end financial institutions at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of GDP per capita 
(equivalent to the GDP per capita of Mongolia, Guatemala, and Brazil, respectively) in our 
sample we find that the relation between the share of low-end financial institutions and having an 
account or loan is significant and positive only at the 25th percentile of GDP per capita, while 
the relation between the share of low-end financial institutions and the share of firms with 
overdraft is not significant at any level of GDP per capita. Thus only in low-income countries do 
firms benefit – in terms of better access to financial services – from a higher share of low-end 
financial institutions. Neither the level of the share of specialized financial institutions nor its 
interaction with GDP per capita enters significantly, although they are jointly significant in the 
overdraft regression. The interaction between banks’ importance and GDP per capita also does 
not enter significantly.   
 
When interacting the relative importance of different segments of the financial system with the 
external dependence across different sectors, none of the interaction term enters significantly. 
Similarly, we do not observe any variation across in the relationship between the relative size of 
different segments of the financial system and access to finance by firms across industries with 
different degrees of asset tangibility. While the interaction term enters significantly in two 
instances the partial effects calculations reveal this does not translate into meaningful 
differences. 
 
When interacting the financial sector indicators with firm size dummies, we cannot find any 
significant relationship between the relative importance of low-end financial and access to 
finance and no differential effect across firms of different sizes, with one exception. Specifically, 
the likelihood of having an account increases with a higher share of low-end financial 
institutions for medium and large firms, while none of the other firm-size interactions enters 
significantly at the 5 percent level. In the case of specialized lenders, we find that a more 
prominent role is associated with a higher likelihood of obtaining an overdraft facility or loan for 
small and medium firms while the relationship is not significant for large firms.  At the same 
time a more prominent role of banks is associated with the opposite effect, that is, a lower 
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likelihood of obtaining an overdraft facility or loan for small and medium-sized firms, and again 
an insignificant effect for large firms.  
 
In summary, the shares of low-end financial institutions and banks among financial 
intermediaries catering to low-end customers have opposite relations with firms’ access to 
financial services in low-income countries, while there are no significant relations in middle-
income countries. These relations are especially strong for small and medium-sized firms and 
economically meaningful more on the credit than deposit side.  
 
(b) Average size of financial institutions  
 
The regressions reported in Table 5 suggest that smaller low-end financial institutions are 
associated with a higher probability of firms having an account. On the other hand, having larger 
specialized lenders is associated with a higher probability of having an overdraft facility and 
loan. The average size of banks is not associated with access to finance. The estimates are also 
economically significant.  One standard deviation in the average size of low-end financial 
institutions is associated with a 3 percent lower probability of having an account, while one 
standard deviation in the average size of specialized institutions is associated with a 24 percent 
higher likelihood of having an overdraft and an 8 percent higher likelihood of getting a loan. The 
average size of banks is not associated with variation in firms’ access to financial services.  
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
The coefficient estimates in the regression reported in Table 6 show a non-linear relationship 
between the average size of different financial institutions and access to finance across countries 
at different levels of GDP per capita, across firms of different sizes, across different external 
financing needs, and across different levels of asset tangibility. Overall, the results suggest that 
larger low-end and smaller specialized financial institutions are better at providing especially 
small firms with access to financial services, though the effects are also significant though 
smaller for medium-sized and larger firms.  We also find larger banks are more conducive to 
small firms’ access to credit, with no significant effect for medium-sized and large enterprises.   
20 
 
In terms of access to credit, however, larger low-end financial institutions seem more appropriate 
in low- and middle-income countries (Panel B), while the relationship between size of 
specialized NBFI and firms’ access to financial services does not vary across countries of 
different levels of GDP per capita.  Larger banks are associated with higher use of bank accounts 
in low- and middle-income countries.  
 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
Several of the interaction regressions with the external dependence and the tangibility variable 
are significant. Specifically, we find  that the positive relationship between the size of low-end 
institutions and firms’ use of loans is stronger for firms in industries more dependent on external 
finance, while the relationship the size between of low-end institutions and the use of overdraft 
decreases in the degree of asset tangibility, indicating that firms in industries with fewer tangible 
assets available for collateral benefit more in terms of access to overdrafts in countries with 
larger low-end financial institutions.  We find a decreasing relationship between the size of 
specialized NBFI and use of accounts as industries’ external dependence increases. Similarly, the 
positive relationship between the size of specialized lenders and the use of overdrafts and loans 
is stronger for industries that rely less on tangible assets. Finally, we find that larger banks are 
less associated with the use of financial services in industries with higher needs of external 
finance and higher asset tangibility.  
 
In summary, larger financial institutions are not necessarily associated with lower use of 
financial services.  The positive relationship between the average size of specialized lenders and 
banks is especially strong for smaller firms, while we also find a positive relationship between 
the average size of low-end financial institutions and firms’ access to credit services in low-
income countries.  
 
(c) Robustness tests  
 
In unreported robustness tests, we gauge the sensitivity of the interaction regressions of Tables 4 
and 6 to the estimation technique. Specifically, we find that our main findings hold when using 
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non-linear estimation techniques as in Tables 3 and 5. We also test for the robustness of our 
results in Table 5 using a constant country sample of 29 to confirm that our results are not driven 
by varying country samples the across the three institutional categories.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Using unique data on financial structure and the average size of different financial institutions, 
this paper explores the implications of the relative importance and average size of institutions 
that cater specifically to SMEs compared to the importance of banks and their average size. 
Specifically, we combine two unique data sets to gauge the relationship between the importance 
of different financial institutions, including low-end financial institutions, specialized lenders and 
banks, as well as the average size of these institutions and firms’ access to financial services, 
including account and lending services. 
 
Our results indicate that the dominance of banks in the financial systems of most developing 
countries is rather detrimental for firms’ access to financial services. We do not find any 
evidence that smaller institutions – be they banks, specialized lenders or low-end financial 
institutions – are better in providing access to finance for enterprises. Critically, however, we 
find that “one size does not fit all.” Low-end financial institutions and specialized lenders seem 
especially appropriate to ease access to finance in low-income countries. Similarly, larger low-
end financial institutions and banks seem to ease access to finance only at low levels of GDP per 
capita. We also find variation across firm sizes, not so much in the importance of different 
segments of the financial system, but rather in the relationship with the average size. We do not 
find that larger low-end financial institutions hurt small firms’ access to credit. Even more 
important, larger specialized lenders and banks are actually associated with a greater likelihood 
of loan and overdraft use by small firms. 
 
Our results, while tentative, send important policy messages. First, the dominance of banks in 
most financial systems across the developing world is indeed associated with the limited access 
to financial services by enterprises. This calls for diversification and more competition within the 
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financial system, including from low-end financial institutions and specialized lenders. Second, 
smaller financial institutions are not necessarily better equipped to improve access to financial 
services by enterprises. While certainly not a call for consolidation, this again implies a 
diversified financial system with institutions of different sizes.  
` 
We see this paper as a first exploration of the relationship between financial structure and SME 
financing. The lack of consistent cross-country data on non-bank financial institutions has 
hampered the gauging of this relationship so far.  As SME finance gains more importance in the 
policy debate, as evidenced by the recent focus of the G20 in this area, more consistent data 
collection will enable a more thorough exploration in the coming years.17   
                                               
17 See, for example, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/g20ifcsmeconslultation.nsf and http://www.smefinanceforum.org/ . 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
A. Firm-level Characteristics           
            
Dummy==1 if firm has account 24531 0.9044 0.2940 0 1 
Dummy==1 if firm has overdraft facility 23952 0.4891 0.4999 0 1 
Dummy==1 if firm has loan  24336 0.4474 0.4972 0 1 
Dummy==1 if firm size small 24659 0.4742 0.4993 0 1 
Dummy==1 if firm size medium 24659 0.3426 0.4746 0 1 
Dummy==1 if firm size large  24659 0.1831 0.3868 0 1 
Dummy==1 if subsidiary 24659 0.1305 0.3368 0 1 
Dummy==1 if publicly listed 24659 0.0575 0.2327 0 1 
% of firm owned by foreign investor 24659 10.7282 29.1665 0 100 
% of firm owned by government 24659 0.7362 6.9009 0 100 
Firm age in years 24659 17.5148 16.0739 0 310 
            
B. Industry-level Characteristics           
            
External dependence ratio 28 0.2871 0.3680 -0.45 1.14 
Tangibility ratio 24 0.2986 0.1417 0.0745 0.6708 
            
C. Country-level Characteristics           
            
GDP per capita (log) 54 6.9650 1.2173 4.8947 8.8859 
Private Credit (% GDP) 54 25.6340 17.4473 2.0892 80.3032 
Mean asset size, low-end NBFI (in 
constant 2000 bn USD) 
36 0.0322 0.1357 0.0000 0.8175 
Mean asset size, specialized NBFI (in 
constant 2000 bn USD) 
33 0.0578 0.0903 0.0004 0.3555 
Mean asset size, banks (in constant 2000 
bn USD) 
50 0.5419 0.7633 0.0099 3.4644 
Asset share, low-end NBFI (%) 33 4.3890 5.2283 0.0564 21.7718 
Asset share, specialized NBFI (%) 33 6.5246 7.5962 0.2727 38.0821 
Asset share, banks (%) 33 89.0864 8.5655 61.1734 98.8938 
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Table 2: Correlations 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Account 1.000                   
2 Overdraft facility 0.344** 1.000                 
3 Loan  0.345** 0.673*** 1.000               
4 Dummy==1 if firm size small -0.267* -0.440*** -0.710*** 1.000             
5 Dummy==1 if firm size medium 0.248* 0.437*** 0.627*** -0.888*** 1.000           
6 Dummy==1 if firm size large  0.234* 0.359*** 0.652*** -0.913*** 0.623*** 1.000         
7 Dummy==1 if subsidiary 0.276** 0.160 -0.112 -0.118 0.059 0.150 1.000       
8 Dummy==1 if publicly listed 0.045 -0.027 0.205 -0.384*** 0.382*** 0.314** -0.077 1.000     
9 % of firm owned by foreign investor 0.124 -0.139 -0.372*** 0.089 -0.076 -0.085 0.644*** -0.131 1.000   
10 % of firm owned by government 0.030 -0.125 0.061 -0.131 -0.001 0.225 0.083 0.418*** -0.009 1.000 
11 Firm age in years 0.302** 0.604*** 0.628*** -0.516*** 0.508*** 0.426*** 0.160 0.144 -0.116 -0.019 
12 External dependence ratio 0.278** 0.407*** 0.383*** -0.520*** 0.408*** 0.522*** 0.198 0.097 0.024 0.022 
13 Tangibility ratio 0.205 0.153 0.244* -0.228* 0.186 0.223 -0.020 0.014 -0.083 -0.024 
14 Private Credit 0.270** 0.326** 0.579*** -0.419*** 0.277** 0.467*** 0.099 -0.033 -0.201 -0.117 
15 GDP per capita (log) 0.176 0.416*** 0.649*** -0.496*** 0.359*** 0.525*** 0.123 -0.004 -0.041 0.022 
16 Asset share, low-end NBFI 0.158 0.032 -0.070 0.018 0.030 -0.056 0.038 -0.014 0.032 -0.009 
17 Asset share, specialized NBFI -0.035 0.186 0.109 0.200 -0.078 -0.265 -0.228 -0.274 -0.064 0.021 
18 Asset share, banks -0.065 -0.184 -0.054 -0.188 0.051 0.270 0.179 0.252 0.037 -0.013 
19 Mean asset size, low-end NBFI -0.020 0.227 0.195 -0.242 0.143 0.253 -0.091 -0.141 -0.183 -0.141 
20 Mean asset size, specialized NBFI 0.198 0.536*** 0.428** -0.040 0.185 -0.078 0.066 -0.191 -0.178 -0.310* 
21 Mean asset size, banks 0.056 0.467*** 0.481*** -0.413*** 0.288** 0.435*** 0.121 -0.193 -0.183 -0.113 
    11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
12 External dependence ratio 0.348*** 1.000                 
13 Tangibility ratio 0.066 0.403*** 1.000               
14 Private Credit 0.360*** 0.392*** 0.225 1.000             
15 GDP per capita (log) 0.409*** 0.427*** 0.033 0.658*** 1.000           
16 Asset share, low-end NBFI 0.070 0.078 0.023 -0.101 -0.267 1.000         
17 Asset share, specialized NBFI -0.124 -0.034 0.044 -0.134 0.158 -0.147 1.000       
18 Asset share, banks 0.068 -0.017 -0.053 0.181 0.023 -0.480*** -0.797*** 1.000     
19 Mean asset size, low-end NBFI 0.085 0.130 -0.030 -0.026 0.232 -0.088 -0.051 0.105 1.000   
20 Mean asset size, specialized NBFI 0.352** 0.137 -0.077 0.401** 0.502*** -0.311 0.575*** -0.302 -0.035 1.000 
21 Mean asset size, banks 0.354** 0.440*** -0.056 0.402*** 0.634*** -0.196 0.070 0.070 0.592*** 0.506*** 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                     
Correlations are at the country-level with firm-level variables averaged by country.              
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Table 3: Assets Shares and Access to Finance 
  Account Overdraft Loan Account Overdraft Loan Account Overdraft Loan 
  probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit 
  mfx/se mfx/se mfx/se mfx/se mfx/se mfx/se mfx/se mfx/se mfx/se 
GDP per capita (log) 0.018 0.127*** 0.109*** 0.01 0.099*** 0.086*** 0.011 0.114*** 0.093*** 
  (0.014) (0.030) (0.021) (0.013) (0.032) (0.021) (0.012) (0.030) (0.019) 
Private Credit 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.002** 0.001* 0.001 0.002** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Dummy==1 if firm size medium 0.067*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.068*** 0.178*** 0.176*** 0.068*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 
  (0.010) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) 
Dummy==1 if firm size large  0.085*** 0.246*** 0.290*** 0.087*** 0.254*** 0.296*** 0.088*** 0.252*** 0.296*** 
  (0.017) (0.033) (0.020) (0.016) (0.032) (0.019) (0.016) (0.033) (0.019) 
Dummy==1 if subsidiary 0.026 0.063*** 0.006 0.028* 0.068*** 0.01 0.028* 0.067*** 0.01 
  (0.016) (0.023) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.015) 
Dummy==1 if publicly listed -0.006 -0.01 0.037 -0.005 0.000 0.043 -0.003 0.000 0.045* 
  (0.015) (0.030) (0.026) (0.014) (0.030) (0.027) (0.014) (0.030) (0.025) 
% of firm owned by foreign 
investor 0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% of firm owned by government 0.000 -0.001 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm age in years 0.001** 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NBFI, low-end 0.003 0.002 0.005*             
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)             
NBFI, specialized       0.001 0.007** 0.004**       
        (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)       
Banks             -0.002* -0.006* -0.004*** 
              (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
N 17,879 17,542 17,686 17,879 17,542 17,686 17,879 17,542 17,686 
# countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Pseudo Adj. R-squared 0.085 0.131 0.126 0.081 0.140 0.127 0.085 0.140 0.129 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
Regressions include unreported industry dummies. Errors are clustered at the country level. Errors for marginal effects are calculated accordingly. 
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, Enterprise Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.       
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Table 4 Panel A: Assets Share and Access to Finance – Cross-Country and Cross-Firm Heterogeneity 
 
 
  
 Account Overdraft Loan 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
NBFI, low-end 0.026** 0.003 0.002   0.096*** 0.002 -0.011   0.029 0.008** 0.003   
  (0.010) (0.003) (0.003)   (0.037) (0.007) (0.009)   (0.023) (0.003) (0.004)   
     x GDP per capita (log) -0.003**       -0.014**       -0.004       
  (0.002)       (0.006)       (0.004)       
     x External Dependence   -0.001       -0.012       -0.007     
    (0.002)       (0.010)       (0.005)     
     x Tangibility     0.004       0.039***       0.012   
      (0.006)       (0.009)       (0.010)   
NBFI, low-end x small       0.004       0.002       0.005* 
        (0.003)       (0.006)       (0.003) 
NBFI, low-end x medium       0.004*       0.001       0.003 
        (0.002)       (0.008)       (0.003) 
NBFI, low-end x large       0.005**       0.006       0.005 
        (0.002)       (0.009)       (0.004) 
N 17,883 10,166 9,939 17,883 17,544 9,973 9,750 17,544 17,690 10,050 9,826 17,690 
# countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Adj. R-squared 0.050 0.039 0.037 0.048 0.182 0.174 0.177 0.169 0.162 0.156 0.157 0.161 
                          
NBFI, specialized -0.016 0.001 0.002**   0.009 0.007*** 0.009***   0.015 0.005*** 0.006***   
  (0.011) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.026) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.019) (0.001) (0.001)   
     x GDP per capita (log) 0.002       -0.000       -0.001       
  (0.001)       (0.003)       (0.002)       
     x External Dependence   0.001       0.000       0.000     
    (0.002)       (0.004)       (0.002)     
     x Tangibility     -0.004***       -0.009       -0.004   
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      (0.002)       (0.006)       (0.003)   
NBFI, specialized x small       0.001       0.007***       0.004* 
        (0.002)       (0.003)       (0.002) 
NBFI, specialized x 
medium       0.001       0.007**       0.005*** 
        (0.001)       (0.003)       (0.002) 
NBFI, specialized x large       0.001*       0.002       0.002 
        (0.001)       (0.004)       (0.002) 
N 17,883 10,166 9,939 17,883 17,544 9,973 9,750 17,544 17,690 10,050 9,826 17,690 
# countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Adj. R-squared 0.046 0.039 0.037 0.044 0.179 0.187 0.189 0.180 0.164 0.159 0.160 0.164 
                          
Banks -0.004 -0.002* -0.003**   -0.024 -0.007*** -0.006   -0.017 -0.006*** -0.006***   
  (0.010) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.019) (0.002) (0.004)   (0.012) (0.001) (0.002)   
     x GDP per capita (log) 0.000       0.002       0.002       
  (0.001)       (0.003)       (0.002)       
     x External Dependence   -0.001       0.006       0.003     
    (0.001)       (0.005)       (0.002)     
     x Tangibility     0.003       -0.001       0.000   
      (0.003)       (0.005)       (0.005)   
Banks x small       -0.002       -0.007**       -0.005*** 
        (0.001)       (0.003)       (0.002) 
Banks x medium       -0.002**       -0.006**       -0.005*** 
        (0.001)       (0.003)       (0.002) 
Banks x large       -0.002**       -0.003       -0.003 
        (0.001)       (0.004)       (0.002) 
N 17,883 10,166 9,939 17,883 17,544 9,973 9,750 17,544 17,690 10,050 9,826 17,690 
# countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Adj. R-squared 0.046 0.041 0.039 0.046 0.181 0.185 0.187 0.179 0.166 0.163 0.164 0.166 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions control for the unreported variables log of GDP per capita, private credit, dummy variables for size (medium and large), the firm being a subsidiary, the firm being 
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publicly listed, the percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors, the percentage of the firm owned by the state, and the firm age in years as well as industry dummies. Errors 
are clustered at the country level. 
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, Enterprise Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.   
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Table 4 Panel B: Asset Share and Access to Finance – Cross-Country and Cross-Firm Heterogeneity, Partial Effects 
  Account Overdraft Loan 
GDP per capita (log) at: p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
NBFI, low-end 0.005** 0.002 -0.002 0.006 -0.008 -0.024 0.005* 0.001 -0.003 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.016) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
NBFI, specialized -0.002 0 0.002** 0.007 0.007** 0.006 0.006 0.005** 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Banks -0.002 -0.002* -0.001 -0.008** -0.006* -0.004 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.003 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
                    
  Account Overdraft Loan 
External dependence at: p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
NBFI, low-end 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.007** 0.007** 0.006 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
External dependence 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.064* 0.064* 0.064* 0.060** 0.060** 0.060** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
NBFI, specialized 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
External dependence 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.063** 0.063** 0.063** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Banks -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** -0.007** -0.006** -0.005 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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External dependence 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.058* 0.058* 0.058* 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
                    
  Account Overdraft Loan 
Tangibility at: p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
NBFI, low-end 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.004 0.005* 0.007* 0.008** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Tangibility -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.163*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
NBFI, specialized 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Tangibility -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Banks -0.002** -0.002** -0.001* -0.006* -0.006** -0.006** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table reports partial effects of ordinary least square regressions that control for the unreported variables log of GDP per capita, private 
credit, dummy variables for size (medium and large), the firm being a subsidiary, the firm being publicly listed, the percentage of the 
firm owned by foreign investors, the percentage of the firm owned by the state, and the firm age in years as well as industry dummies. 
Regressions with external dependence and tangibility interaction term also include unreported level effects. Errors are clustered at the 
country level. Errors for partial effects are calculated accordingly. 
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, Enterprise Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.     
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Table 5: Average Size and Access to Finance 
 
 
  Account Overdraft Loan 
  probit probit probit 
  mfx/se mfx/se mfx/se 
NBFI, low-end -0.076*** -0.004 -0.031 
  (0.025) (0.096) (0.054) 
N 18,642 18,238 18,445 
# countries 36 36 36 
Pseudo Adj. R-squared 0.076 0.110 0.108 
        
NBFI, specialized 0.122 1.076*** 0.370* 
  (0.117) (0.252) (0.189) 
N 17,998 17,566 17,799 
# countries 33 33 33 
Pseudo Adj. R-squared 0.063 0.135 0.107 
        
Banks 0.001 0.051 0.009 
  (0.011) (0.036) (0.016) 
N 22,554 21,983 22,354 
# countries 50 50 50 
Pseudo Adj. R-squared 0.058 0.104 0.108 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions control for the unreported variables log of GDP per 
capita, private credit, dummy variables for size (medium and 
large), the firm being a subsidiary, the firm being publicly listed, 
the percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors, the 
percentage of the firm owned by the state, and the firm age in 
years as well as industry dummies. Errors are clustered at the 
country level. Errors for marginal effects are calculated 
accordingly. 
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, 
Enterprise Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.   
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Table 6 Panel A: Average Size and Access to Finance – Cross-Country and Cross-Firm Heterogeneity 
 
  Account Overdraft Loan 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
NBFI, low-end 3.129 -0.097*** -0.092***   16.680* -0.088 -0.047   14.036* -0.112* -0.091   
  (4.582) (0.029) (0.031)   (9.489) (0.101) (0.111)   (7.416) (0.062) (0.072)   
     x GDP per capita (log) -0.379       -1.975*       -1.665*       
  (0.542)       (1.128)       (0.880)       
     x External Dependence   -0.013       -0.080       0.096***     
    (0.014)       (0.072)       (0.035)     
     x Tangibility     -0.033       -0.234**       -0.017   
      (0.043)       (0.101)       (0.092)   
NBFI, low-end x small       -0.081***       0.076       0.041 
        (0.028)       (0.102)       (0.058) 
NBFI, low-end x medium       -0.078***       -0.045       -0.034 
        (0.024)       (0.101)       (0.061) 
NBFI, low-end x large       -0.065***       -0.039       -0.095* 
        (0.022)       (0.097)       (0.056) 
N 18,646 10,398 10,157 18,646 18,240 10,173 9,938 18,240 18,449 10,282 10,045 18,449 
# countries 36 36 36.000 36 36 36 36.000 36 36 36 36.000 36 
Adj. R-squared 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.147 0.151 0.152 0.143 0.143 0.141 0.142 0.140 
                          
NBFI, specialized 1.537 0.140 0.145   0.970 0.952*** 1.257***   4.372 0.409** 0.665***   
  (1.996) (0.122) (0.164)   (4.240) (0.213) (0.230)   (2.797) (0.206) (0.159)   
     x GDP per capita (log) -0.179       0.006       -0.489       
  (0.240)       (0.520)       (0.338)       
     x External Dependence   -0.149**       0.023       -0.124     
    (0.064)       (0.258)       (0.157)     
     x Tangibility     -0.171       -1.117***       -1.039***   
      (0.258)       (0.406)       (0.372)   
35 
 
NBFI, specialized x small       0.114       1.125***       0.494*** 
        (0.120)       (0.264)       (0.191) 
NBFI, specialized x 
medium       0.063       1.065***       0.394* 
        (0.095)       (0.248)       (0.216) 
NBFI, specialized x large       0.034       0.695***       0.123 
        (0.091)       (0.263)       (0.167) 
N 18,002 10,235 10,005 18,002 17,568 10,005 9,779 17,568 17,803 10,119 9,891 17,803 
# countries 33 33 33.000 33 33 33 33.000 33 33 33 33.000 33 
Adj. R-squared 0.031 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.170 0.179 0.182 0.171 0.141 0.141 0.143 0.139 
                          
Banks 0.553** 0.000 0.011   -0.508 0.028 0.050   0.175 -0.001 0.025   
  (0.242) (0.015) (0.018)   (0.681) (0.039) (0.044)   (0.405) (0.021) (0.028)   
     x GDP per capita (log) -0.066**       0.067       -0.020       
  (0.029)       (0.081)       (0.048)       
     x External Dependence   -0.023***       -0.052***       -0.025     
    (0.009)       (0.019)       (0.023)     
     x Tangibility     -0.061*       -0.123***       -0.108**   
      (0.033)       (0.033)       (0.053)   
Banks x small       0.013       0.086**       0.037** 
        (0.014)       (0.038)       (0.018) 
Banks x medium       -0.007       0.046       0.010 
        (0.010)       (0.037)       (0.018) 
Banks x large       -0.010       0.007       -0.020 
        (0.009)       (0.032)       (0.017) 
N 22,563 11,869 11,612 22,563 21,985 11,587 11,336 21,985 22,359 11,751 11,497 22,359 
# countries 50 50 50.000 50 50 50 50.000 50 50 50 50.000 50 
Adj. R-squared 0.043 0.040 0.038 0.033 0.139 0.150 0.152 0.139 0.140 0.149 0.151 0.142 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions control for the unreported variables log of GDP per capita, private credit, dummy variables for size (medium and large), the firm being a subsidiary, the firm being 
publicly listed, the percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors, the percentage of the firm owned by the state, and the firm age in years as well as industry dummies. 
Regressions with external dependence and tangibility interaction and term also include unreported level effect. Errors are clustered at the country level. 
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Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, Enterprise Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.   
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Table 6 Panel B: Average Size and Access to Finance – Cross-Country and Cross-Firm Heterogeneity, Partial Effects 
 
Account Overdraft Loan 
GDP per capita (log) at: p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
NBFI, low-end 0.768 0.333 -0.044 4.387* 2.121* 0.162 3.675* 1.765* 0.114 
  (1.209) (0.588) (0.054) (2.470) (1.178) (0.101) (1.941) (0.932) (0.076) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.009 0.009 0.009 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
NBFI, specialized 0.31 0.22 0.057 1.012 1.015** 1.020*** 1.017** 0.720** 0.323** 
  (0.355) (0.238) (0.080) (0.703) (0.467) (0.259) (0.494) (0.304) (0.146) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.054 0.054 0.054 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Banks 0.152** 0.064** 0.003 -0.105 -0.016 0.045 0.057 0.031 0.013 
  (0.069) (0.031) (0.010) (0.194) (0.091) (0.036) (0.116) (0.054) (0.018) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 0.123* 0.123* 0.123* 0.074* 0.074* 0.074* 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
  
           Account Overdraft Loan 
External dependence at: p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
NBFI, low-end -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.101*** -0.094 -0.099 -0.11 -0.104* -0.098 -0.085 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) 
External dependence 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.052* 0.052* 0.052* 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
NBFI, specialized 0.128 0.113 0.098 0.954*** 0.956*** 0.958*** 0.399* 0.387* 0.374* 
  (0.119) (0.116) (0.113) (0.220) (0.232) (0.245) (0.204) (0.203) (0.202) 
External dependence 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.056** 0.056** 0.056** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Banks -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 0.024 0.021 0.014 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) 
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External dependence 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.061** 0.061** 0.061** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
                    
  Account Overdraft Loan 
Tangibility at: p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
NBFI, low-end -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.104*** -0.09 -0.113 -0.136 -0.094 -0.095 -0.097 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.107) (0.106) (0.105) (0.065) (0.062) (0.061) 
Tangibility -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
NBFI, specialized 0.114 0.098 0.081 1.054*** 0.945*** 0.836*** 0.475*** 0.374* 0.272 
  (0.129) (0.115) (0.104) (0.231) (0.241) (0.257) (0.184) (0.205) (0.230) 
Tangibility -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Banks 0 -0.006 -0.012 0.028 0.016 0.004 0.006 -0.005 -0.016 
  (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) 
Tangibility 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table reports partial effects of ordinary least square regressions that control for the unreported variables log of GDP per capita, private 
credit, dummy variables for size (medium and large), the firm being a subsidiary, the firm being publicly listed, the percentage of the firm 
owned by foreign investors, the percentage of the firm owned by the state, and the firm age in years as well as industry dummies. 
Regressions with external dependence and tangibility interaction term also include unreported level effects. Errors are clustered at the 
country level. Errors for partial effects are calculated accordingly. 
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, Enterprise Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.     
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Appendix 1: Asset Share and Asset Size by Country 
 
  Asset Share   Mean Assets in bn USD (constant)     
Country low-end NBFI 
specialized 
NFBI Banks   
low-end 
NBFI 
specialized 
NFBI Banks   
Number 
of 
Firms 
Belarus             0.430   273 
Benin             0.115   150 
Bolivia 15.12 0.34 84.54   0.024 0.021 0.410   613 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.19 3.24 94.58   0.003 0.039 0.099   361 
Botswana 0.55 12.47 86.98   0.001 0.156 0.511   342 
Brazil 0.83 5.52 93.64   0.003 0.180 2.668   1802 
Bulgaria           0.017 0.665   288 
Burkina Faso 21.77 3.24 74.99   0.001 0.010 0.100   394 
Cameroon 4.66 10.64 84.70           363 
Chile 0.45 1.52 98.03   0.004 0.355 2.481   1017 
Colombia 0.74 38.08 61.17   0.024 0.327 0.931   1000 
Cote d'Ivoire 1.51 3.73 94.76           526 
Croatia         0.026   1.054   633 
Czech Republic             1.356   250 
Ecuador 4.78 5.89 89.32   0.009 0.013 0.217   658 
Gabon 5.49 5.01 89.49   0.005 0.010 0.187   179 
Georgia             0.029   373 
Ghana 3.35 4.34 92.31   0.000 0.004 0.129   494 
Guatemala           0.016 0.385   522 
Guinea-Bissau             0.010   159 
Honduras 6.31 1.67 92.02   0.072 0.006 0.174   436 
Hungary 6.01 11.79 82.21   0.015 0.034 1.325   291 
Kazakhstan           0.016 0.093   544 
Kenya 17.09 3.09 79.82   0.000 0.042 0.127   657 
Kyrgyz Republic         0.000   0.016   235 
Latvia 0.06 6.07 93.87   0.000 0.040 0.616   271 
Macedonia, FYR 1.27 1.51 97.21   0.003 0.005 0.147   366 
Madagascar 5.33 0.27 94.40   0.007 0.002 0.171   445 
Malawi 2.88 1.97 95.15   0.000 0.007 0.060   150 
Mali             0.138   490 
Mauritius 0.68 5.20 94.12   0.022 0.160 0.396   398 
Moldova         0.000   0.027   363 
Mongolia 0.79 3.49 95.73   0.000 0.000 0.086   362 
Montenegro         0.008   0.050   116 
Mozambique 2.64 14.21 83.15   0.008 0.075 0.225   479 
Namibia         0.000   0.565   329 
Niger             0.041   150 
Paraguay 11.43 7.86 80.71   0.001 0.012 0.137   613 
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Peru 3.39 4.36 92.25   0.018 0.086 1.239   632 
Philippines 10.34 3.15 86.51   0.007 0.023 1.274   1326 
Poland         0.010   1.886   455 
Rwanda 5.96 23.35 70.69           212 
Senegal 2.05 0.65 97.30           506 
Serbia           0.011 0.145   388 
Sierra Leone             0.024   150 
Slovak Republic             1.584   275 
Tajikistan         0.000   0.032   360 
Tanzania 0.89 7.06 92.05   0.000 0.013 0.109   419 
Togo             0.064   155 
Turkey 1.94 3.03 95.03   0.818 0.033 3.464   1152 
Uganda 0.98 4.33 94.68   0.000 0.008 0.078   563 
Ukraine 0.64 0.46 98.89   0.000 0.002 0.133   851 
Uruguay 1.66 15.13 83.21   0.070 0.181 0.833   621 
Zambia 1.03 2.64 96.33   0.000 0.003 0.059   484 
                  25641 
                    
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports and Enterprise Surveys as described in the text.   
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